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JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS
This Court has jurisdiction over judgments of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(3)(a) and jurisdiction over writs pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 78A-3-102(2).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the panel majority of the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
the time for filing a petition for review of an appeal board decision under the Utah
Municipal Code (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)) runs from the date of the order
reflecting that decision.
Standard of Review: The decision of the Court of Appeals is reviewed for
correctness.
COURT OF APPEALS9 DECISION
Brett Perez v. South Jordan City, a Utah municipal corporation; and South Jordan
City Appeal Board, 2011 UT App 430, December 15, 2011. See Addendum A.
STATUTES1
Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1106(6):
(a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of
Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review.
(b)

Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the
issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board.

1

A copy of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106 is attached as Addendum B. Section 10-3-1106
was amended effective May 8, 2012. The version of the statute attached at Addendum B
is that version which was in effect at the time Mr. Perez filed his appeal in 2010.
1
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(c)

The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board
and for the purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion
or exceeded its authority.

Utah Code Annotated § 10-3-1106(5):
(a)
(i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be
certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it,
except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii).
^ixy JL \JL g u u u ^aui2>v/, niV/ u u a i u i i i a ^ wvtv/ijuu tiiC/ u - u a ) ' p v / i i u u Uii<u\-/i

Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and
municipality both consent.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Brett Perez ("Perez") was employed as a police officer with the South Jordan City
Police Department. On May 28, 2009, he failed to activate appropriate equipment in
violation of Department policy and state statute. This was Perez's fourth disciplinary
action in 25 months. In April 2008, Perez engaged in a vehicle pursuit against
Department policy and was suspended without pay for thirty (30) days. In July 2008, he
was demoted for his lack of candor and veracity. On May 23, 2009, he was counseled for
speeding through a residential neighborhood en route to a noise complaint.
After a pre-disciplinary hearing, Police Chief Lindsey Shepherd ("the Chief5 or
"Chief Shepherd") terminated Perez's employment. Perez appealed his termination to the
South Jordan City Appeal Board ("Appeal Board") which conducted its hearing on
May 26, 2010. On June 7, 2010, the Appeal Board issued and dated its Decision and
Order upholding the termination. Perez filed a Petition for Review, pursuant to Utah

2
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Code Ann. §10-3-1106, with the Utah Court of Appeals thirty-two (32) days later on
July 9, 2010.
The Utah Court of Appeals dismissed Perez's appeal for lack of jurisdiction
reasoning that Perez had failed to file his appeal "within 30 days after issuance of the
final action or order of the appeal board." Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106(6)(b). Perez's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari was granted on March 29, 2012.
B.

Statement of Facts.

1.

The Appeal Board's decision upholding the Chiefs decision to terminate

Perez is dated June 7, 2010. See Addendum C.
2.

The Decision and Order was mailed to Perez's counsel on June 10, 2010.

See Cover Letter from City Recorder, Addendum D. The cover letter which
accompanied the Decision and Order explains: "Section 4-06(5)(e)(4) of the South
Jordan Employee Handbook states, 'any final action or order of the board may be
appealed by either the employee or the City to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing with
that court a notice of appeal no later than 30 days from the date of the issuance of the
final action or order of the board.'" Id.
3.

Perez's Petition for Review of the Appeal Board's June 7, 2010 decision

was filed with the Utah Court of Appeals on July 9, 2010, thirty-two (32) days after the
date of the Appeal Board's decision. See Petition for Review and Court docket,
Addendum E and F, respectively.
4.

The Utah Court of Appeals dismissed Perez's appeal for lack of jurisdiction

concluding that "[bjecause the thirty-day time period for filing a petition for review of
3
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the Board's decision commenced as of the date of the order - June 7, 2010 - Perez's
petition for review, filed on July 9, 2010, was untimely." Addendum A, ^ 8.
5.

On March 29, 2012, this Court granted Perez's Petition for Writ of

Certiorari on the following issue:
Whether the panel majority of the court of appeals erred in holding that
the time for filing a petition for review of an appeal board decision under
i±±vs v-/ t a n xvxu.xixv/ipai o u a o AUJJLD XAUUUL tiiC/ licitx/ o i UJLV u x u u AOXiv-zUtiiig, u i a t

decision.
Order, Addendum G.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals because Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6) establishes that a petition for review must be filed within 30
days of issuance of the order of the appeal board. Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106(5), upon
which Perez relies, establishes the deadline for an appeal board to certify its decision to
the recorder. Each subsection addresses a discreet subject.
That an appeal board decision is issued on the date it bears on its face is a settled
issue. In an analogous case under the Administrative Procedures Act, this Court held,
"that the date the order constituting final agency action issues is the date the order bears
on its face." Dusty's, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992)
(per curium) (emphasis original). This Court's decision is consistent with Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 14(a) which provides that "a petition for review shall be filed with
the clerk of the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time

4
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prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order T
(Emphasis supplied).
ARGUMENT
I.

THE QUESTION - WHEN A PETITIONER HAS TO FILE AN APPEAL
FROM A § 10-3-1106 APPEAL BOARD DECISION - IS SETTLED BY THE
STATUTE ITSELF AND ANALOGOUS CASE LAW AND RULES.
The Utah Municipal Code provides that "[a] final action or order of the appeal

board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for
review . . . within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or order of the appeal
board.55 Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(a)-(b) (Supp. 2011) (emphasis supplied). The
decision of the Appeal Board is dated June 7, 2010. It was provided to the City Recorder
on June 10, 2010, who mailed it to Perez that same day with a cover letter advising him
that he could seek appellate review by filing "a notice of appeal no later than 30 days
from the date of the issuance of the final action or order of the [B]oard.55 Addendum D.
Significantly, the letter does not say an appeal must be filed within 30 days of this letter,
or 30 days of certification; it explicitly states the appeal must be filed within 30 days of
issuance.2 See id.

Perez claimed below that he was mislead by the City Recorder's letter into believing the
time for filing an appeal commenced on the date of the letter, rather than the date of the
order. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument concluding: "Nothing in the letter
equates the date of issuance with the date of delivery to the City Recorder. It was not
reasonable for Perez to simply assume that he could rely on the date of the letter rather
than the date of the order in calculating the time for filing a petition for review.
Furthermore, we disagree with Perez that the City Recorder had any obligation to point
out 'the time lag between the date of the order and date of its certification5 or to 'advise
Perez that his appeal window [was] less than 30 days due to such delay.555 Perez v. South
Jordan City, 2011 UT App 430, \ 7, 268 P.3d 877.
5
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The term "issuance" is not defined by the Utah Municipal Code, but its plain
meaning should be applied. "When interpreting a statute we look first to its plain
language. We read the plain language of the statute as a whole [] and interpret its
provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters."
Pearson v. South Jordan City, 2012 UT App 88, ^ 18, 275 P.3d 1035 (internal quotation
aiiu citation oniitteu;. nie uecision oi hie rippeai ooaiu was issueu on tue uate it Gears
on its face. To apply some other date, not born on the face of the written decision, would
"render uncertain the time for appeal in virtually every case." Silva v. Department of
Emp't Sec., 786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (mem.) (per curiam) (holding that
"appeal time commences when the final agency order issues and not when allegedly
received by a party"). To conclude that a decision is issued on the date it bears on its face
promotes the important policy of establishing consistency in appeal deadlines. See Perez,
2011 at If 4 (citing Silva, 786 P.2d at 247). To choose any other date - particularly one
not borne on the decision itself- is confusing.
This Court has taken up the subject when a decision "issues" in Dusty's, Inc. v.
Utah State Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (per curiam). In Dusty's,
this Court considered the statutory language: "A party shall file a petition for judicial
review of final agency action within 30 days after the date that the order constituting final
agency action is issued....).

Id. at 870 (quoting § 63-46b-14(3)(a)) (emphasis original).

Dusty's argued that the date of "issue" was ambiguous and susceptible to several
inconsistent interpretations but this Court did not find the argument persuasive. Instead,
this Court held: "For Dusty's future guidance and the guidance of all those who petition
6
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for judicial review from agency action, we hold that the date the order constituting the
final agency action issues is the date the order bears on its face." Id. (emphasis original).
The Court of Appeals relied upon Dusty's in concluding that the Appeal Board decision
issued on the date it bears on its face, June 7, 2010. u We see no reason to interpret the
Utah Municipal Code any differently." Perez at \ 4.
Consistent with Utah Municipal Code §10-3-1106(6)(a)-(b), and this Court's
holding in Dusty's, Rule 14(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a
petition for review "shall be filed with the clerk of the Court of Appeals within the time
prescribed by statute or, if there is no time prescribed, within 30 days after the date of the
order or decision." If Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6) did not provide a thirty day
deadline for filing an appeal, Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(a) would apply; and
Perez would have had 30 days after the date of the order or decision, in this case July 7,
2010, in which to file his notice of appeal. Instead he filed his notice of appeal 32 days
after the date of the Decision and Order. In order to preserve appeal times which are
certain and consistent, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6) should be read consistently with
Rule 14(a) and the Decision and Order deemed issued on the date it bears.
Because Perez failed to file his Petition for Review within thirty (30) days of the
Appeal Board's decision, it was untimely and this Court should affirm the Court of
Appeals' decision to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

7
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II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE UTAH
CODE ANN. §10-3-1106(5) ADDRESSES THE TIME THE APPEAL
BOARD HAS TO ISSUE A DECISION, NOT THE TIME A PETITIONER
HAS TO APPEAL.
Utah Municipal Code § 10-3-1106(5)(a) sets a deadline - for the Appeal Board -

to certify its decision to the City Recorder. Subsection (5)(a) instructs the Appeal Board
that its decision "shall be certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter
is referred to it. . .," which procedure the South Jordan City Appeal Board followed.
Subsections (5)(a) and (b) ensure that a decision is made by the Appeal Board in
relatively short order, "15 days/5 or that that deadline is extended to a "maximum of 60
days, if the employee and municipality both consent." Subsection (5)(a) does not
establish a deadline - for the appellant - to file a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals.
Utah's Municipal Code does address the timing for filing an appeal, but that is in
Section 10-3-1106(6) which explains that a "final action or order of the appeal board may
be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review." Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(a). The petition for review "shall be filed within 30 days after
the issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board." Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-3-1106(6)(b). The legislature did not use the subsection (5)(a) phrase, "certified to
the recorder," when referring to the time by which an appellant must file a petition for
review. Instead, the statute refers to "issuance of the final action or order." Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(b). The two concepts are distinct. Subsection (5)(a) requires the
Appeal Board to certify a decision within 15 days. Subsection (6)(b) addresses how long

8
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after "issuance" an appellant has to file a petition for review. The statutory language
does not suggest that Subsections (5) and (6) must be read in conjunction with one
another, and Perez fails to identify any authority which supports that theory. To the
contrary, the subsections address two different deadlines, one for the Appeal Board and
another for the appellant.
The Utah Court of Appeals explained that Subsection (5)(a)(i) "merely provides a
deadline for the Board to certify its decision to the recorder; it does not add an additional
requirement for issuance to be complete." Perez at \ 5. "Like the mailing of an order,
which we have held on several occasions does not extend the time for filing a petition for
review, the certification of the order to the City Recorder is merely a step in the process
of notifying the petitioner of the Board's decision. It does nothing to delay the date of
issuance." Id.
Perez contends that an appeal board could conceivably sign its decision and then
hold onto the decision before tendering it to the recorder for certification thereby
prejudicing the appellant. That is not what happened in this case, and if it had, it would
have violated the express provision of 10-3-1106(5)(a)(i) which requires the Appeal
Board to certify its decision to the City Recorder within 15 days of the matter being
referred to it (absent an agreement of the parties to extend that deadline under (5)(a)(ii)).
So the worst case scenario Perez imagines, in which an Appeal Board holds a decision for
3

In compliance with Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106(5)(a)(i) the South Jordan City Appeal
Board did provide its Decision and Order to the City Recorder on June 10, 2010, three (3)
days after the date of the Decision and Order, and fifteen (15) days after the matter was
referred to the Appeal Board (the hearing was held on May 26, 2010). See June 10, 2010
letter from the South Jordan City Recorder, Anna West, Addendum D.
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

more than 15 days before certifying it to the recorder, would be an independent violation
of the statute. The statute does not prescribe when or how a City Recorder is to convey
the Appeal Board decision to the parties. To tie the time for appeal to certification to the
City Recorder, or mailing by the City Recorder, or receipt by the parties, or anything
other than the date the order bears - is to create uncertainty and inconsistency in the
VJ-WCtVULXXX^ JLV/X XXXXXX£, CU.X CXjp^/C'CXX.

XJLX LXXXO O O - O O ,

tXX'C/ KsJLLy

1 V C V U 1 UX/X

j^XUxXXpLXy
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Decision and Order within three days of its issuance. Perez's statutory right to appeal to
the Utah Court of Appeals was not violated.
Perez also argues that the Appeal Board's decision was not "final" until it was
"certified" by the City Recorder, Pet'r Brief at p. 7. But there is no language to that
effect in the Utah Municipal Code and no case law to support the theory either. The Utah
Municipal Code does not tie the finality of the decision to certification. The decision was
final when signed and dated by the Appeal Board, the City Recorder had no authority to
change it.
Perez also argues that the City Recorder is a "key intermediary between appeal
boards and municipal employees." Pet'r Brief at p. 13. This argument is likewise
without support in either the statute or case law interpreting it. Certification within a time
certain to the City Recorder is all that is required under § 10-3-1106(5). It is a tortured
interpretation of the statute to create some role for the recorder as a "key intermediary."
Finally, Perez contends that the Court of Appeals' application of Utah's
Administrative Procedures Act, which does not contain language about certification,
renders the certification process of 10-3-1105(a) "superfluous." Pet'r Brief at p. 12. That
10
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is not the case. The certification process of Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1105(a) ensures that a
decision is timely provided to the recorder (within 15 days or up to 60 days upon
stipulation of the parties).
CONCLUSION
Section 10-3-1106, and analogous case law and rules are settled; an appellant has
30 days from the date of an appeal board's order in which to file a petition for review.
Perez filed his Petition for Review 32 days after the South Jordan City Appeal Board's
June 7, 2010 decision. The Utah Court of Appeals appropriately dismissed his appeal as
untimely.
DATED this W^ day of June, 2012.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Camille N./fbhnson \
Maralyn M. EnglishJ

11
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF .APPEALS
-00O00—

}^EMORANDUM DECISION

Brett Perez,
Petitioner,
v.
South Jordan City, a Utah municipal
corporation; and South Jordan City
Appeal Board,

CaseNo.20100545-CA

FILED
Pecember 15,2011)
2011 UTApp 430

Respondents.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

Ryan B. Hancey, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner
Camille N. Johnson and Maralyn M. English, Salt Lake City, for
Respondents

Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Voros.
DAVIS, Presiding Judge:
11
Brett Perez contests the decision of the South Jordan City Appeal Board (the
Board) upholding the termination of his employment with South Jordan City. We
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
f2
The Utah Municipal Code provides that "[a] final action or order of the appeal
board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for
review/' which must "be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final action or
order of the appeal board." Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(a)-(b) (Supp. 2011). The
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decision of the Board in this case was dated June 7, 2010, and states, "The Board
requests the City Recorder certify this decision in accordance with the South Jordan City
Employee Handbook." See generally id. § 10-3-1106(5)(a)(I) ("Each decision of the appeal
board . . . shall be certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is
referred to it
"); City of South Jordan Employee Handbook § 4~06(5)(e)(2), available at
http://sjc.utah.gov/pdf/HR-EmployeeHandbook-pdf (same). The City Recorder
received the decision on June 10,2010, and immediately mailed it to Perez with an
accompanying letter notifying him that he could seek appellate review by filing "a
notice of appeal no later than 30 days from the date of the issuance of the final action or
order of the [BJoard." Perez filed a petition for review in this court on July 9,2010.
f3
Perez contends that his petition for review was timely filed in this court because
the time for appeal did not begin until the decision was certified to the City Recorder.
Respondents, South Jordan City and the Board, maintain that the decision was issued as
of the date of the order and that Perez's petition for review was due n o later than July 7,
2010. We agree with Respondents.
14
We have previously stressed the importance of establishing clear deadlines for
appeals, a policy that is advanced by measuring filing deadlines from the date a
decision is issued rather than the date it is mailed. See Silva v. Department ofBmp't Sec,
786 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah C t App. 1990) (mem.) (per curiam) (rejecting a proposed rule
that "would render uncertain the time for appeal in virtually every case'7). Perez
attempts to distinguish his case by asserting that the decision of the Board could not be
considered "issued" until it was certified to the City Recorder. However, in construing
the Utah Administrative Procedures Art our supreme court has held "that the date the
order constituting the final agency action issues is the date the order bears on its face."
Dusty's, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 868, 870 (Utah 1992) (per curiam)
(construing Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a) (1989) (current version at id. § 63G-4401(3)(a) (2008))). We see no reason to interpret the Utah Municipal Code any
differently.
15
While the Utah Municipal Code states that the Board's decision "shall be certified
to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it," see Utah Code
Ann. § 10-3-1106(5)(a)(I), this requirement merely provides a deadline for the Board to
certify its decision to the recorder; it does not add an additional requirement for
issuance to be complete. Like the mailing of an order, which we have held on several
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occasions does not extend the time for filing a petition for review, see Bonded Bicycle
Couriers v. Department qfEmp't Sec, 844 P.2d 358, 360 (Utah Ct App. 1992) (per curiam);
Silva, 786 P.2d at 247; see also Dusty's, 842 P.2d at 870, the certification of the order to the
City Recorder is merely a step in the process of notifying the petitioner of the Board's
decision. It does nothing to delay the date of issuance.
16
Perez argues that this interpretation results in a violation of his right to seek
judicial review because he had no access to the Board's decision until after it was
mailed to him by the City Recorder. He argues that "[i]f the time between execution
and certification of a decision applies toward the time for appeal, nothing would
prevent an appeal board from holding a decision for twenty-nine days, giving a
potential appellant just one day in which to timely appeal." We agree with Perez that a
lengthy delay could conceivably result in the .violation of a petitioner's statutory right to
seek judicial review and observe that a delay of any more than fifteen days would
violate the plain language of section 10-3-1106(5)(a)(I). However, a violation of the
petitioner's right to statutory review does not automatically follow every time there is a
gap of any length between the issuance of the decision and its certification and mailing.
C/. Buczynski v. Industrial Comm'n, 917 P.2d 552,555 (Utah 1996) (holding that where a
decision of the Industrial Commission was not mailed until after the time for filing a
petition for review had passed and petitioner's counsel promptly filed the petition upon
receiving notice of the order, petitioner's statutory right to judicial review could not be
denied based on the expiration of the thirty-day period). The City Recorder's mailing of
the decision within three days of its issuance was sufficiently prompt and did not result
in a violation of Perez's statutory right to seek judicial review of the decision.
17
We are also not persuaded by Perez's argument that the City Recorder's letter
could have reasonably misled him into believing that the time for filing a petition for
review commenced as of the date of the letter rather than the date of the order. The
decision, a copy of which was enclosed with the letter, was clearly dated June 7,2010.
The City Recorder's letter states that a copy of the decision "was delivered to [the City
Recorder's] office . . . June 10,2010," but then goes on to explain that a notice of appeal
must be filed "no later than 30 days from the date of the issuance of the final action or
order of the board." (Internal quotation marks and additional emphasis omitted); see
also Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(6)(b). Nothing in the letter equates the date of issuance
with the date of delivery to the City Recorder. It was not reasonable for Perez to simply
assume that he could rely on the date of the letter rather than the date of the order in
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calculating the time for filing a petition for review. Furthermore, we disagree with
Perez that the City Recorder had any obligation to point out "the time lag between the
date of the order and date of its certification" or to "advise Perez that his appeal
window [was] less than 30 days d u e to such delay."
f8
Because the thirty-day time period for filing a petition for review of the Board's
decision commenced as of the date of the order—June 7, 2010—Perez's petition for
review, filed on July 9,2010, was untimely. y/[T]he timely filing of petitions of review
. . . is jurisdictional," Leonczynski v. Board of Review, 713 P.2d 706,706-07 (Utah 1985)
(mem.), "and failure to timely file results in dismissal," Blauer v. Department of Workforce
Servs., 2007 UT App 280, f 7,167 P.3d 1102. See also Silva, 786 P.2d at 247. Accordingly,
we dismiss this case. See generally Varian Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570
(Utah C t App. 1989) ("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only
the authority to dismiss the action.").

James Z. Davis,
Presiding Judge

19

I CONCUR:

J. Frederic Voros Jr=, Judge

ORME, Judge (dissenting):
J10 I dissent. Unlike the majority, I do see a reason to interpret the Utah Municipal
Code (the UMC) differently from the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA).
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UAPA does not include a provision like the UMC provision that imposes a certification
step. I think the UMC's requirement that the decision be certified to the City Recorder
is analogous to the requirement that judgments be filed with the court clerk before they
become final and appealable. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(b)-(c) (explaining that a
"judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes . . . when it is
signed [by the judge] and filed [with the clerk]") (emphasis added); Willden Family
Dental, Inc. v. Cannon, 2007 UT App 404U, para. 3 (mem.) (per curiam) (holding that
"[e]ntry of a final, appealable judgment... occurred, when the order granting summary
judgment was both signed by the district court judge and filed with the clerk").
111 If a judge signs a judgment on June 7, but it is; not filed by the court clerk until
June 10, the judgment is effective on June 10. See Willden Family Dental, Inc., 2007 UT
App 404U, para. 4. The Board in this case may have signed its decision on June 7, but
the statutorily required certification to the city recorder could not have happened until
June 10, the day the City Recorder indicated in her transmittal letter to Perez that the
decision was delivered to her and the day on which she mailed what she characterized
as "a copy of the official Certified Decision & Order" to Perez.1
112 Decision "issuance" under the UMC did not ripen until the decision was certified
to the City Recorder, as required by the mandatory language of the statute. See Utah
Code Ann. § 10-3-1106(5)(a)(i) (Supp. 2011). The uncertainty my colleagues worry
about is simply not presented by this case. Holding to my view—that issuance equates
lr

The majority takes comfort in a per curium memorandum decision, Silva v.
Department of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Unlike the
petitioner in Silva, however, Perez is not claiming that the fact his copy was mailed on
June 10, but did not reach him until later, means his appeal time was extended. See id.
at 247. Instead, Perez focuses his attention on certification, which is much more
analogous to a clerk filing a court's final order than it is to mailing notice of an
immediately effective decision. In Silva we were apparently concerned about the
uncertainty that would ensue if petitioners used the date on which a decision was
mailed or on which they received a decision in the mail as the starting date for appeal
and judicial review deadlines, and we held that the starting date has to be "when the
final agency order issues and not when [it is] allegedly received by a party." Id. In line
with Silva, Perez acknowledges his appeal time started to run on June 10, with
certification to the city recorder, not at some later date when he received the decision.
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to the date a signed order is certified—promotes just as much certainty as the majority's
view that issuance equates to the date of signing by the Board.2 And my view
recognizes, as did the Board, the importance of statutorily mandated certification.3

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

2

It may actually be that my view promotes greater certainty. In this case, there
was a blank for the day i n June when the order was signed- Someone—one of the three
signatories, presumably—penned in "7." It is admittedly a legible, distinct seven in this
case. But what if it looked like it could be a one or a seven? Or what if the signatories
neglected to fill in the blank? Or what if the copy mailed to Perez bore one handwritten date and the copy in the Board's file bore a different one? The uncertainty
resulting from such ambiguity would be eliminated by reliance on the more
straightforward certification date.
3

The Board's decision ends with the request that "the City Recorder certify this
decision." And, as noted, the recorder also appreciated the importance of this step,
taking pains in her transmittal letter to refer to the copy enclosed for Perez as /ya copy of
the official Certified Decision &c Order/'
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Utah Code

Utah Code
Title 10 Utah Municipal Code
Chapter 3 Municipal Government
Section 1106 Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer — Appeals — Board —
Procedure.
10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer — Appeals - Board Procedure.
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, suspended without pay,
or involuntarily transferred to a position with less remuneration:
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing body, or heads of
departments.
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more flaan two days without pay, or involuntarily
transferred from one position to another with less remuneration for any reason, the employee may,
subject to Subsection (2)(b), appeal the discharge, suspension, without pay, or involuntary transfer to a
board to be known as the appeal boards established under Subsection (7).
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee shall exhaust the
employee's rights under that grievance procedure before appealing to the board.
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with the
municipal recorder within 10 days after:
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee receives notice of the
final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance procedure; or
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the discharge, suspension, or
involuntary transfer.
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal recorder shall forthwith
refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal board.
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board shall forthwith
commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, andfiiUyhear and determine the matter which
relates to the cause for the discharge, suspension, or transfer.
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer may:
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel;
(b) have a public hearing;
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board.
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall be certified to the
recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)
(ii).

(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection (5)(a)(i) to a maximum
of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the employee shall receive:
(i) the employee's salary for the period of time during which the employee is discharged or suspended
without pay; or
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was transferred to a position of
less remuneration.
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals by filing
with that court a petition for review.
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the issuance of the final
action or order of the appeal board.
(c) The Court of Appeals' review shall be on the record of the appeal board and for the
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purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its authority.
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, the number of
members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure for conducting an appeal and the
standard of review shall be prescribed by the governing body of each municipality by ordinance.
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a council-mayor form under
Chapter 3b3 Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal Government, an ordinance adopted under
Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal
board.
Amended by Chapter 19, 2008 General Session
Amended by Chapter 115,2008 General Session
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SOUTH JORDANCTTYBOARD OF APPEALS
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE! OF UTAH

In Re: Tennioation of Brett Perez
DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION
On the date of May 26-27,2010, the above entitled matter came before the South
Jordan City Appeals Board ('"Board35) for a hearing to review a decision issued by the South
Jordan City Police Chief Lindsay Shepherd ("Chief Shepherd") to terminate Officer Brett Perez
("Officer Perez"). Chief Shepherd's decision to terminate Officer Perez followed a predisciplinary hearing which was conducted by Chief Shepherd on the date of November 4,2009
pursuant to the South Jordan City Employee Handbook § ^06 (4). Chief Shepherd's decision to
terminate Officer Perez was issued on the date of November 12,2009, for an incident which
occurred on the date of May 28,2009, wherein Officer Perez was found by the South Jordan
Police Department to have engaged in a high speed police pursuit in a manner which violated the
South Jordan Police Department and Policy and Procedures Manual, Chapter 26.1.1 Regulation 7
- Unsatisfactory Performance; and Chapter 26.1.1 Code of Conduct Regulation 42 Performance of Duty. Officer Perez appealed Chief Shepherd's decision to terroinate him.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
There are two basic issues for the Board to consider when reviewing a decision to
discipline or terminate an employee: 1) whether sufficient evidence exists to support the
allegation of employee misconduct; and 2) whether the discipline imposed is appropriate, or
proportionate to the severity of the misconduct Pursuant to Utah Code Aon. § 10-3-1106 (7) (a),
"the procedure for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the
governing body of each municipality by ordinance/3 Under the South Jordan City Employee
Handbook, § 4-06 (5) cL 5), the standard of review to be applied in this case "is a preponderance
of the evidence/' Thus the Board applies the preponderance of the evidence" standard to the
question of whether the allegations described in Chief Shepherd's November 12,2009
termination letter are supported by sufficient evidence.
"Utah law has provided little guidance on the precise factors used to balance the
proportionality of the punishment to the offense/3 Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App
274, PI 8 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) In the Ogden City case, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed a
decision by the Ogden Civil Service Commission to not terminate a firefighter, who was
investigated by the Ogden City Fire Department for sundry acts of misconduct The variety of
instances where misconduct was found to have occurred led the Utah Court of Appeals to
remand this case to the Ogden Civil Service Commission, with direction to evaluate more closely
whether the misconduct waixanted termination. I i A t P 1 5 .
The statue which governs Ogden Civil Service Commission (Utah Code Ann. § 10-31012) differs from the operative statute which governs the Board (Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1106).
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However, the principles established in the Qgden City case for evaluating the proportionality of
punishment to rnisconduct also guide the Board's review of whether Chief Shepherd's decision
to terminate Officer Perez is proportionate to his misconduct These principles include:
[A]n exemplary service record and tenuous evidence of misconduct may tip the
balance against terminatioEL On the other hand, dishonesty, or a series of
violations accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive discipline may
support termination ... Other courts have given weight to considerations of (a)
whether the violation is directly related to the employee's official duties and
significantly impedes his or her ability to caccy out those duties; (b) whether the
offense was of a type that adversely affects lEhe public confidence in the
department; (c) whether the offense undermines the morale and effectiveness of
the department; or (d) whether the offense was committed willfully or knowingly,
rather than negligently or inadvertently. See 5 Antieau on Local Gov't Law, §
79.11 [4], [5] (2002); Eugene McQnillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations §
12.237 (3d e& 1999); 15A Am. Jur. 2d Civil Service §§ 50, 65 (2000). Courts
have further considered whether the misconduct is likely to reoccur. See SkoHy v.
State Pers. Bd., 15 CaL 3d 194,124 Cal. Rptc. 14,539 P.2d 774,791 (CaL 1975).

Qgden City, 2005 UT App 274, PI 8. After evaluating the facts of this case to determine
whether termination of Officer Perez is proportionate to the severity of his misconduct,
the Board may reverse Chief Shepherd's choice of disdph'ne as nnduly excessive "only
when the punishment is "clearly disproportionate" to the offense,... and "exceeds the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality.'"' Qgden City. 2005 UT App 274, P17 (Utah
Ct App. 2005) [Quoting: In re Discharge of Jones, 720 P.2d at 1363].

SUMMARY Off EVIDENCE RECEIVED BY SOUTH JORDAN CITY
APPEALS BOARD
On the Date of May 26,2010, the Board received into evidence: 1) a booklet of exhibits
submitted by Officer Perez, Nos. 1-20; 2) a booldet of exhibits submitted by South Jordan City,

3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Nos. 1-17, and video recordings from events which involved Officer Perez on the dates of April
1, 2008 and May 28,2009. The Board has also heard TestimonyfromOfficer Perez, Sergeant
Whitalcer,Chief Shepherd, City Manager John Geihnann, and Ryan Loose. Having considered
the evidence received on May 26,2010, and having considered introductory statements and the
arguments of the parties, the Board herebyfindsthe following facts, by a preponderance of the
evidence:

mmmGS

1.

OF FACT RELEVAIsTT TO MISCONDUCT ON MAY 28,2009.

Officer Perez was on duty as a patrol officer for the South Jordan Police

Department during the early morning hours of May 28,2009. At approximately 0130 hours
Officer Perez hears sergeant Crist report over the police radio that he has identified a suspicious
vehicle ei the Family Motor Sports business in the Wal Mart Complex, South Jordan, UtahSoon after identifying the suspicions vehicle, Sergeant Crist reports the vehicle has sped away
from its initial location with its headlights tamed off. The vehicle was last seen driving east on
9800 South at 3200 West
2.

Officer Perez responded to this report "by driving to the location of 9800 South

2700 West Officer Perez' vehicle was facing wost on 9800 South Street at this location. By the
time he reached this location, Officer Perez was advised by Sergeant Crist that the vehicle's
description was a dark green SUV.
3.

Officer Perez soon identified a vehicle traveling eastbound toward him: on 9800

SontL Officer Perez initiated his emergency equipment and drove toward the suspect to initiate

/
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a traffic stop, but the vehicle continued to drive past Officer Perez and toned northbound on
2700 West
4.

Officer Perez pursued the suspect for a limited distance on 2700 West, but

terminated pursuit upon determining the vehicle would not stop in response to Officer Perez*
pursuit. As Officer Perez disengaged the pursuit, Officer Perez noticed the vehicle turn east into
a neighborhood at approximately 9400 South. This neighborhood is accessible onlyfrom2700
West Because Officer Perez determined the suspect vehicle would need to come back to 2700
West in order to escape the area, Officer Perez drove to the location of 9435 S outh 2700 West
Once at this location, Officer Perez again identified the suspect vehicle attempting to leave the
area, but in reaction to Officer Perez' arrival, the suspect drove the vehicle in reverse on 9435
South and attempted to conceal himself in a cul de sac at 2525 West.
5. •

Officer Perez entered the cul de sac and soon identified the suspect vehicle parked

in a yard with its lights turned off. Officer Perez exited his patrol vehicle with weapon drawn
and ordered the suspect driver to stop. The suspect driver then activated his headlights and drove
toward Officer Perez; however, the vehicle soon changed direction southward, drove to the end
of the cul de sac, and began to turn around. Officer Nichols arrived in his patrol vehicle at this
time.
6.

Officer Perez waived Officer Nichols past ]nm to enable pursuit of the suspect

As Officer Nichols drove in the direction of the end of the cul de sac, Officer Perez positioned
himself in the road in an effort to block the suspect's escape. Officer Nichols was not successful
in stopping the suspect vehicle in the cul de sac, and the suspect vehicle returned in the direction
of Officer Perez. While standing in the approaching vehicle's pathway, Officer Perez pointed his
duty weapon at the approaching vehicle, but the vehicle did not stop. Rather, the suspect vehicle
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drove directly at Officer Perez as he stood in the roadway at 2625 West. Officer Perez was
forced to jump out of the way of the suspect vehicle to avoid being struck
7.

The suspect vehicle headed westbound on 9435 South, aresidential street,

through 2700 West and continued westbound until the suspect vehicle reached 3200 West,
whereupon the suspect vehicle headed north. During this time, Officer Nichols remained in
close pursuit of the vehicle, and periodically called out the suspect's location- As the suspect
vehicle escaped the area of the cul de sac at 2625 West, Officer Perez returned to ids patrol
vehicle and attempted to rejoin Officer Nichols' pursuit However, Officer Perez stated that he
could not immediately rejoin Officer Nichols m his pursuit of the suspect vehicle becausefaythe
time he was again operating his patrol vehicle, the suspect vehicle has nearly reached 3200 Vest
on 9435 south. Officer Perez elected to not follow7 the suspect vehicle on 9435 South, and
instead heads northbound on 2700 West, in case the suspect vehicle changes direction to the east
again.
8.

hi order to keep pace with the pursuit of the suspect vehicle, Officer Perez attains

speeds of np to 70 miles per hour. The speed limit for this area is 35 miles per hour.
9.

While travelling North on 2700 West, Officer Perez does not activate Ins

emergency equipment Officer Perez' failure to activate this equipment in effect keeps his
dashboard video camera from activating as well.
10.

As Officer Perez pursues the suspect vehicle by heading north on 2700 West,

Officer Nichols continues his pursuit of the suspect vehicle to a residential neighborhood to the
northeast of the intersection at 7000 South 3200 west During this pursuit, the suspect vehicle
loops back south in the direction of 7800 South, again driving on 3200 West. During ibis time,
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Officer Nichols would frequently call out the location and direction of travel of the suspect
vehicle.
11.

Officer Perez monitors Officer Nichols' description of his pursuit and eventually

decides to head west on7800 Souths from 2700 West. Officer Perez stops his patrol vehicle
when he is approximately half-way between 2700 West and. 3200 West Streets. Coincidentally,
the suspect vehicle opts to head east on 7800 Southfiom32.00 West, straight in the direction of
Officer Perez. Officer Perez spots the approaching suspect vehicle, activates his overhead
emergency lights and positions his vehicle in the middle of 7800 South Street. The suspect
vehicle disregards Officer Perez7 vehicle and continues easi: on 7800 South Street Officer Perez
neglects to activate his siren at the time he activates his em*5rgency lights.
12.

Officer Perez reverses the direction of his vehicle as the suspect vehicle continues

. eastbound on 7800 South Street Officer Nichols remains close behind the suspect vehicle in his
pursuit of the same. The suspect vehicle enters the intersection of 7800 South 2700 West and
turns north as Officer Perez pursues the suspect vehicle, behind Officer Nichols, and turns north
in this intersection as well. Officer Perez emergency siren remains off as he proceeds through
this intersection,
13*

By operation of the traffic control devices at this intersection, Officer Perez did

not have the light of way to enter the intersection. Thus, immediately before Officer Perez enters
the intersection, a vehicle headed northbound on 2700 West travels through the intersection and
immediately puils over to allow Officer Perez through on 2700 West. No other vehicles entered
the intersection at 2700 West 7800 South as Officer Perez proceeded through the same. Officer
Perez initiated his siren sometime shortly after proceeding through the intersection.
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14.

Further description of the facts leading to the termination of Officer Perez' pursuit

is not warranted. From testimony offered by Chief Shepherd, Soufh Jordan City has represented
that after Officer Perez proceeded through the intersection at 2700 West 7800 South and
activated all emergency equipment, specifically his emergency siren, all subsequent actions
taken by Officer Perez complied with. South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy and Utah Law.

ANALYSIS
L

Sufficient Evidence E-xists to support the allegation that Officer Perez violated the
South Jordan Police Department Policy and Procedures Manual, Chapter 26,1-1
Code of Conduct Regulation 7 — Unsatisfactory Performance, and Chapter 26.1.1
Code of Conduct Regulation 42 -Performance of Duty.

As Officer Perez operated his police patrol vehicle from the intersection of 9435 S outh
2700 "West and to the point "where he proceeds through the intersection of 7800 South 2700 West,
Officer Perez violated The South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy and Utah Code Ann § 416a-212 in several respects. "While testifying before the Board, Officer Perez admitted that Ms
failure to activate a siren while turning left at the intersection of 7800 South 2700 West was a
violation of policy. Specifically, we find Officer Perez failure to initiate a siren before entering
this intersection constitated a neglectful oversight, which resulted in a violation of Regulation 42
under Chapter 26. L1. of the South Jordan Police Department's Policy and Procedure Manual.
Therefore, the Board will not discuss this violation further here, but in context of whether the
decision to terminate Officer Perez is proportionate to his policy violations (below).
Officer Perez disputed whether his act of speeding northbound on 2700 West violated
City Policy or the Traffic Code, This issue is related to the question of whether Officer Perez3

8
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act of speeding required him to activate emergency equipment while doing so. Therefore, this
activity will be folly discussed in this Section.
The Board has determined that Officer Perez failed to initiate either emergency overhead
lights or siren while traveling northbound on 2700 West (from 9435 South), and this failure
facially violates the Traffic Code. During this leg of Officer Perez' pursuit, he operated his
patrol vehicle at speeds of over 70 miles per hour. The posted speed limit for 2700 West is 35
miles per hour.
The Board notes that at the time Officer Perez was traveling northbound on 2700 west,
from 9435 South, Officer Perez could have lawfully exceeded the speed limit nnder the Traffic
Code, Utah Code Ann. § 41~6a-212 (2) states, "The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle
may... (c) exceed the maximum speed limits, unless prohibited by a local highway authority
under Section 41-6&-208.55 However, this statute does not jjive officers unbridled discretion to
txcood the speed limit An officer's authority to exceed a ]x>sted speed limit is limited to
specific instances of law enforcement activity. In the present case, Officer Perez was authorized
to exceed maximum speed limits because he was "in the pursuit of an actual or suspected
violator of the law." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-212 (2) (b).
While Officer Perez was authorized to exceed the speed limit under Utah law, he was
also required under the statute to undertake specific measures to protect the safety of the public
while in pursuit of the suspect Utah Code Aim. § 41-6a-212 (4) allows an officer in pursuit to
exceed the speed limit "only when: (a) the operator of the; vehicle: (i) Sounds and audible signal
under Section 41-6a-l 625; and (ii) uses a visual signal with emergency lights ..." Emphasis
added. The Board finds that: 1) officer Perez was in pursuit of the suspect vehicle when he was
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speeding northbound on 2700 "West Street and 2) during this pursuit, he failed to comply with §
4 l-6a-212 (4) when he failed to initiate traffic lights or a siren.
Before reaching this conclusion, the Board carefully considered Officer Perez' argument
that he was not required to initiate emergency equipment during this segment of events on May
28,2009. Officer Perez asserts that lie was not required to initiate any emergency equipment as
he proceeded northbound on 2700 Vfest at a speed of 70 miles per hour. Officer Perez' argues
that he was not engaged in a pursuit at the time he exceeded the speed limit His argument is
based in part on Ms belief that Ms proximity to the suspect was too remote to be fairly considered
a pursuit under Utaht law. Therefore, Officer Perez asserts his driving m excess of the speed
limit to catch a distant suspect is better characterized as "normal patrolling activities "with the
puipose of identifying and apprehending violators." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-212 (3) (b). If
Officer Perez' interpretation of the Traffic Code is correct, then he has not violated the Traffic
Code because ha "may exceed die speed limit when engaged in normal patrolling activities with
the puipose of identifyingand apprehending violators/3 Id.
The Board believes that acceptance of Officer Perez' interpretation of the traffic code
would create an exception under Utah Code Anm § 41-6a-212 (3) (b), which swallows the rule
under § 41-6a-212 (4). It is important to note that by the time Officer Perez is proceeding
northbound, the Suspect Vehicle has come dangerously close to running over Officer Perez.
This event created probable cause that the suspect had committed a forcible felony under Utah
law. Therefore, Officer Perez' response to this event is well beyond the ken of "normal
patrolling activities" contemplated under § 41-6a-212 (4). If Officer Perez5 interpretation of 1he
traffic code is correct, then the Board cannot fathom when a pursuit could ever occur, as opposed
to a "normal patrolling activity."
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Moreover, if the Board accepted the notion that Officer Perez' was too remotefiomthe
suspect to be considered "in pursuit," at the time he sped north on 2700 West, then his
remotenessfromthe suspect would equally prevent the Boiardfromconcluding that his speeding
was done in the course of <cnormal patrolling activity." This would lead the Board to conclude
that there is no basis for Officer Pereztoviolate traffic laws while northbound on 2700 West
The Board notes that neither of the terms., ccm pursuit'5 nor "normal patrolling activity" is
fully defined in the Traffic Code. Therefore,, the Traffic Code offers no guidance on when
proximity of the suspect to a pursuing police officer necessarily ends the pursuit of the suspect,
or if the suspect's distancefromthe officer renders Hie officer's pursuit to be "normal patrolling
activity." However, we believe the South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy defines a
"Vehicular Pursuit" to include the activities of Officer Perez at thetimehe sped north on 2700
West Street
South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy §41 J2.2, Definition No. 21, casts a broad net
over the sorts of activities which constitate a vehicular pui-suit This term is defined to mean "an
active attempt by a law enforcement officer in an authorised emergency vehicle to apprehend
fleeing suspect(s) who are attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive tactics." Id. The
Board notes that the proximity ofthe officer to the suspect is not a factor in detenrdning whether
an officer's activity constitutes a pursuit Simply put, if aa officers action constitutes "active
•attempt... to apprehend fleeing suspect(s)* then he is in pursuit. Officer Perez testified that
while speeding northbound on 2700 West, his intended purpose was to apprehend the suspect in
this case. Therefore, the South Jordan City Vehicle Pursuit Policy would hold Officer Perez
speeding northbound on 2700 south to be a ''"pursuit" This finding in turn reqxnres Officer Perez
to activate lights and siren under the traffic Code. Failure to do so constituted a facial violation

n
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of the Traffic Code, and South Jordan City's vehicle pursuit policy. This violation in ten
amounts to unsatisfactory performance of his duties under Regulation 7 of the Sough Jordan
Policy Department Policy and Procedures Manual.

H.

THE SEVERITY OF OEEECER PEREZ7 DISCIPLINE -TERMINATION- IS NOT
DISPROPORTIONATE TO BffiS CONDUCT ON THE DATE OF MAY 28, 2009,
WHEN EXAMINED TOGETHER WITH OJEICER PEREZ5 DISCIPLINARY
RECORD.
A. Turning Left Through the Intersection of 7800 South 2700 West Without Activating
An Emergency Siren Was More Significant Than a Mere Technical Violation.
From the outset, Officer Perez argues that the only clear violation of South Jordan City's

vehicle pursuit policy occurred when Officer Perez turned left through the intersection of 7800
South 2700 West "withoutfirstactivating Ms siren. Officer Perez characterizes this incident as a
mere technical violation which does not warrant severe discipline. The Board may be inclined to
agree with Officer Perez' characterization of this event if the Board simply counted the seconds
from the moment the suspect vehicle drove past officer Perez, to the point where Officer Perez
activated his emergency siren. The time span which elapsed from the moment Officer Perez
should have initiated, his siren to th& moment he did activate the same is not the s.ole -issye to
consider in weighing the. severity of this misconduct The Board cannot overlook the fact that
during this brief period of time, Officer Perez' failure to initiate his emergency siren occurred
when he needed it most: as he proceeded into an intersection when intersecting traffic had the
right of way.

This failure enhanced the degree of danger-posed to the public, and therefore

cannot be considered a mere technical violation of policy.
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Officer Perez also does not consider this violation as cumulative in relation to his other
failures to follow South Jordan City's vehicle pursuit policy on the night of May 28, 2009,
because he did not believe his prior act of speeding without activating emergency lights or siren
to' violate South Jordan vehicle pursuit policy. The Board finds Officer Perez committed not
one but three separate instances of misconduct during the pursuit of May 28, 2009. Therefore,
wefindthese instances to be significant

B. Disciplinary History.
hi his letter to Officer Perez, dated November 12., 2009^ Chief Shepherd notes that
Officer Perez has been found to violate policy on three separate occasions prior to his violation
of policies on the date of May 28,2009. During the hearing, Chief Shepherd opined that Officer
Perez' history of misconduct while operating a vehicle shows a pattern of pooT judgment, which
has not improved despite his training. These separate instances of misconduct warrant some
discussion because they formed a part of Chief Shepherd's basis to terminate Officer Perez'
employment
On April 1,2008, Officer Perez willfully engaged in a pursuit of a speeding vehicle. This
pursuit violated South Jordan vehicle pursuit policy in several respects, including: travelling at
an excessive speed through at least one intersection when required by policy to stop;
continuation of pursuit when policy called for Officer Perez to disengagefromthe same; and
operation of an unmarked vehicle at speeds of over 100 miles per hour. During the course of this
pursuit, an accident occurred where three people were severely injured. Two of the three injured
persons were innocent travelers, who were struckfrombeliind by the vehicle which Officer
Perez had pursued During the Board hearing of May 26,2010, the facts of this event were
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Miy vetted by the parties; ho-wever, the events on this date were not before the Board to consider
whether Officer Perez5 conduct on this occasion violated South Jordan City Department Policies.
We therefore summarily accept in this Ruling that on April 1,2008, Officer Perez's pursuit of
another vehicle was conducted in a manner which violated policies and procedures governing
vehicle pursuits by South Jordan Police Officers,
Officer Perez5 discipline for the events of April 1,2008 included a 30 day suspension
without pay, and loss of vehicle take home pnvilegeis for 60 days. In addition, Officer Peiez was
directed to receive remedial training on department policies relating to vehicle pursuits,, and
further required to develop and conduct departmental in-service training on vehicle pursuit
policy.
On M y 3,2008, Officer Perez was nearly tenninated for a lack of veracity during a
supervisor's inquhy and subsequent investigation. The facts of this event support the conclusion
thai Officer Perez was not honest "with a supervising officer when questioned about whether he
had taken a vote from officers under his supervision to determine if they favored a proposal to
change work schedules. In lieu of termination, Officer Perez was demoted from the rank of
Sergeant to Senior Patrol Officer. Officer Perez was also advised that this event would be kept
permanently in bis personnel file, and any further violation of South Jordan City policy would
result in his termination.
On May 23,2009, Officer Perez was discovered to have operated his vehicle at an
excessive speed of 83 miles per hour while responding to a report of a noise complaint The
nature of this complaint did not warrant breaking speed limits in order to respond. Officer Perez
was verbally counseled for ibis incident by his immediate supervisor. It is not known to the
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Board as to why this incident did not undergo further review, in light of Officer Perez' warning
that he wonld be terminated for any other violations of South Jordan City policy.
While addressing the history of discipline against him, Officer Perez's argument raises
two separate issues. First, Officer Perez believes termination at this point of his career is
excessive, because it is the next step on a path of progressive discipline which was built upon an
excessive punishment imposed for the incident of April 1,2008. Officer Perez believes
excessive discipline was imposed on this date because that decision rested on improper
references to prior acts of misconduct which Officer Perez purged from his disciplinary record,
with approval of the South Jordan Police Department
In support of this position, Officer Perez offers as evidence a Memorandum to Chief
Shepherd which documents an occasion on April 24,2005, wherein Officer Perez was found to
have operated his vehicle at a speed of 73 miles per hour, in. excess of the posted speed limit of
45 miles Per Hour. (See Exhibit No. 11, submitted by Officer Perez.) This incident resulted in
his pursuit by a patrol officer, and was eventually stopped for-speeding. The memorandum of
May 17,2005 contains a discussion about another incident which occurred on March 15,2000,
wherein Officer Perez was found to be operating a personal vehicle at a rate of speed which
"drew the attention" of a traffic officer, and caused him to puisne and stop Officer Perez. (See
Exhibits 11 and 10, submitted by Officer Perez.) The memorandum of May 17,2005 should not
have discussed the event of March 15,2000 because documentation of this event was purged
from Officer Perez personnel file and therefore could not be used against him in subsequent
disciplinary proceedingsSimilarly, Officer Perez' speeding on April 24 2005 was lightly discussed in a
Memorandum to Chief Shepherd which recommends discipline for the occasion on April 1,200S
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where Officer Perez improperly pursued a vehicle which eventually crashed. (See Exhibit No.
12, submitted by Officer Perez). Importantly, this memorandum states., "Sgt Perez does have a
disciplinary action that resulted in a 10 day suspension- This action is no longer active in his file
however it is just short of being two years ago. Due to its Removal it is not clear as to the
specifics of his past suspension-'5 From this passage, Officer Perez invites the Board to
conclude that Ms discipline would have been less severe for the April 1^ 2008 incident if Exhibit
No. 12 had contained no improper reference to prior discipline. The Board declines to accept
this inference from the evidence. The board believes that the term suspension imposed on
Officer Perez for his involvement in the pursuit of April 1,2008 was warranted, regardless of
whether an improper reference to prior misconduct was discussed in a memorandum, to Chief
ShepherdMoreover, Officer Perez5 argument that Chief Shepherd's decision to terminate him is
tainted by excessive discipline imposed for the occasion of April 1,2008 fails for the simple
reason that the Board cannot find any evidence fhe final decision to impose a 3 0 days suspension
for the April 1,2008 incident relied on any previous discipline of Officer Peiez. Exhibit No. 2,
submitted by South Jordan City, documents the disciplinary action taken against Officer Perez
for the April 1? 2008 incident This document appears to be some sort of a form document which
shows a "place-holder" to insert the previous disciplinary record of Officer Perez. Importantly,
this portion of the document is left blank. Therefore, the Board cannot conclude that the final
decision to suspend Officer Perez for 30 days relied on any disciplinary history which was
officially purged.
Finally, Officer Perez next argues that termination of his employment is excessive, in
light of the instances where other officers employed by the South Jordan Police Department have
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operated their assigned vehicles in violation of South Jordan City Policies. Some of these
instances of misconduct resulted in vehicular accidents, but very few of these instances of
misconduct resulted in severe discipline. In support of this position, Officer Perez submitted a
summary chart which only generally describes 25 separate instances of improper vehicle
operation. (See: Exhibit 14, submitted by Officer Perez). The Board identifies that two officers
received sever discipline on this chart Officer Phillips rearfved a two day suspension, Officer
Johnson was terminated, and Officer Bar&ss appears to have resigned after his second traffic
accident resulted in the loss of driving privileges for one year.
The Board concludes that the information contained in this chart at most suggests Officer
Perez could have received discipline which is excessive and inconsistent with discipline meted
out to other officers. However, this chart was submitted without any additional evidence, such as
testimony folly describing any of the traffic incidents described in Exhibit 14. Standing alone,
Exhibit 14 does not enable the Board to conclude Perez argument is supported by a
preponderance of evidenceHaving found the issues raised by Officer Perez to not support the conclusion that Chief
Shepherd's decision to terminate him was excessive,, the Board now applies the guiding
principles described in the Ogden City (Siqpra) to the present case. The board concludes that the
evidence presented to the Board at hearing establishes an example of "dishonesty, [and] a series
of violations accompanied by apparently ineffective progressive discipline/5 Ogden City. 2005
UT App 274., PI 8. We therefore believe that the Board cannot conclude Chief Shepherd abused
his discretion ia electing to terminate Officer Perez employment with South Jordan City.
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Board hereby concludes the conduct of Officer Perez during the course of a high
speed pursuit on the date of May 28,2009 violated Regulations 7 and 42 of the South Jordan
Police Department Policy and Procedures Manual. After considering the instances of
misconduct "which occurred on May 287 2009, together with Officer Perez disciplinary history
from the date of April 1,2008, the Board concludes that Chief Shepherd did not abuse his
discretion in electing to terminate Officer Perez employment with South Jordan City. Rather, the
Board concludes that the decision to terminate Officer Perez is well supported by the facts of the
May 28,2009 pursuit, when in viewed in light of Officer Perez disciplinary history.
This Decision and Order is approved by the Board following vote by secret ballot which
occuxred on the Date of May 27,2010. The signatures of the Board found on this Decision and
Order establish the Board's approval of the basis for its decision, without acknowledging the
vote of any particular Board Member.
The Board hereby affirms the decision of Chief Shepherd to terminate Officer Perez*
employment with South Jordan City, The Board requests the City Recorder certify this decision
m accordance with the South Jordan City Employee Handbook.

Dated this 7

day of June, 2010

SOUTH JORDAN C7TY EMPLOYEE APPEAL BOARD

Board Member
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a ~W...Keni Money,.Mayor-— • - - —
Brian Butters, Council Member
(Cathie L Johnson, Council Member
Larry 5hortr Council Member
Aleta Taylor, Council Member
Leona Winger, Council Member
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June 10,2010Ryan B. Hancey
Scott S. Bridge
Kesler & Rust
68 South Main Street, 2nd Floor '
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Camille N. Johnson
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Re: Employee Appeals Board Certified Decision for Brett Perez v. South Jordan City
Dear Mr. Hancey & Ms. Johnson,
Enclosed is a copy of the official Certified Decision & Ordear of the Employee Appeals Board
Hearing held May 26,2010 for Brett Perez v. South Jordan City that was delivered to my office "
today, June 10,2010.
Section 4-G6(5)e(4) of the South Jordan Employee Handbook states, "any final action or order of
the board may be appealed by either the employee or the City to the Utah Court of Appeals by
filing with that court a notice ofappeal no later than 30 daysfromthe date of the issuance ofthe
fined action or order ofthe board?
Sincerely,

Anna M. West
City Recorder, CMC
Cc:

.
'

Mr. Brett Perez
John H. Geilmann, City Manager
I Rob Wall, City Attorney
South Jordan Employee Appeals Board Members

1 6 0 0 WEST TOWNE CENTER DRIVE

SOUTH JORDAN, UTAH 8 4 0 9 5
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RYAN B.HANCEY (9101)
KESLER & RUST
Mclntyre Building, 2nd Floor
68 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801.) 532-8000 .
Attorneys for Brett Perez

IN THE UTAH COURT OF JtfPEALS

BRETT PEREZ, an individual,

PETTHON FOR REVIEW

Petitioner,
v.

Appeal No.

SOUTH JORDAN CITY, a Utah
municipal corporation^ and SOUTH
JORDAN CITY APPEAL BOARD,

South Jordan City.Appeal Board
decision dated June 7,2010

Respondents.

Notice is hereby given that Brett Perez, Petitioner, by and through his counsel of record,
Kesler & Rust, petitions the Utah Court of Appeals to review the decision of the Respondent South
Jordan City Appeal Board dated June 7, 2010 and which was delivered to Petitioner on June 11,
- 2010.
This petition seeks review of the entire decision made by the Board, a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit "A".
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Petitioner requests the court to direct the Respondents to prepare and certify to the court its
entire record, which shall include all of the proceedings and evidence taken in this matter.
. DATED this

(

day of July 2010.
KESLER&RUST

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be delivered by the method indicated below a true and correct
copy of the Petition for Review this _fL day of My 2010.
FEDERAL EXPRESS
~">C U.S.MAIL
i__
HAND DELIVERY
TELEFAX TRANSMISSION
South Jordan City Appeals Board
Attn: Anna West, City Recorder
1600 West To-wne Center Drive
South Jordan, Utah 84095
Camille N. Johnson
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

\ \^mr
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Appellate Docket Search
Docket Information Case - 20100545
Utah Court of Appeals
Title: Perez v. South Jordan
Docket No: 20100545
Agency: City of South Jordan
Status: Appellant Brief Piled
Date

Action

Docket Date: 07/09/2010
Case:
Disposition Date

07/09/2010 Receipt for Payment
07/09/2010 Writ of Review Filed
07/20/2010 Transcript Request Received
07/28/2010 Docketing Statement Filed
08/02/2010 Ref. to Mediation Office - R.
08/02/2010 Call for Record Pursuant to R.
08/12/2D10 Record Filed - Pursuant to R.l
11/08/2010 Misc. Letter
11/15/2010 .Mediation Withdrawn/Terminated
11/16/2010 Perfect Docketing Statemnt Ltr
11/19/2010 Supplement to Docket Statement
11/22/2010 Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Withdrawn
12/03/2010 Response to Motion for Summary
12/07/2010 Response to Motion for Summary
12/21/2010 Defer-Plenary Consideration Or
12/21/2010 Perfect Record/Record Index le
01/11/2011 Record Filed
01/13/2011 Set Briefing Schedule
02/17/2011 Misc. Letter
02/25/2011 Appellant's Brief Filed
02/28/2011 Misc. Letter
01/01/3000 Clerk1s Note
01/01/3000 Appellee's Brief Due
Due
01/01/3000 Brief on Disc-Due
Due
D

12/21/2010

03/30/2011
03/11/2011
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
—ooOoo—

|rn|L_

FILED
UTAH APPELUTE COURTS
j^g 2 9 2012

Brett Perez,
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 20120019-SC

South Jordan City, a Utah
municipal corporation; and
South Jordan City Appeal Board,
Respondents.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
filed on January 13,2012.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 51 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
granted as to the following issue:
Whether the panel majority of the court of appeals erred in
holding that the time for filing a petition for review of an
appeal board decision under the Utah Municipal Code runs
from the date of the order reflecting that decision.
A briefing schedule will be established hereafter.

For The Court:

Dated Z°( MMAh T®^

1*Wfl(

(\<hM^

Ronald E.. Nehrine
O
Nehring
Associate Chief Justice
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